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ABSTRACT 
Growing global interconnection and interdependency of computer networks, in combination 
with increased sophistication of cyber attacks over time, demonstrate the need for better understanding 
of the collective and cooperative security measures needed to prevent and respond to cybersecurity 
emergencies.  The Exploring Cyber International Relations (ECIR) Data Dashboard project is an initial 
effort to gather and analyze such data within and between countries. This report describes the prototype 
ECIR Data Dashboard and the initial data sources used.  
In 1988, the United States Department of Defense and Carnegie Mellon University formed the 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) to lead and coordinate national and international efforts 
to combat cybsersecurity threats. Since then, the number of CERTs worldwide has grown dramatically, 
leading to the potential for a sophisticated and coordinated global cybersecurity response network. This 
report focuses primarily on the current state of the worldwide CERTs, including the data publicly 
available, the extent of coordination, and the maturity of data management and responses. The report 
summarizes, analyses, and critiques the worldwide CERT network.  
Additionally, the report describes the ECIR team's Data Dashboard project, designed to provide 
scholars, policymakers, IT professionals, and other stakeholders with a comprehensive set of data on 
national-level cybersecurity, information technology, and demographic data. The Dashboard allows 
these stakeholders to observe chronological trends and multivariate correlations that can lead to insight 
into the current state, potential future trends, and approximate causes of global cybersecurity issues. 
This report summarizes the purpose, state, progress, and challenges of developing the Data Dashboard 
project.  
 Disclaimer: This report relies on publicly available information, especially from the CERTs’ 
pubic web sites. They have not yet been contacted to confirm our understanding of their data. That will 
be done in subsequent phases of this effort. 
 
© Copyright MIT, 2009 
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1. Introduction 
The development of the modern economy, and of sophisticated information technology in particular, 
has led to an increasing global interconnectivity and interdependence. Such interconnectivity deeply 
benefits commerce and communication, but collectivizes vulnerabilities and security problems to a 
state the international community has not before had to address. The development of collective and 
collaborative cybersecurity has been formally underway for more than twenty years, and much 
progress has been made. Nonetheless, there remain many opportunities to further develop collaborative 
and decentralized collective cybersecurity networks and procedures. 
The purpose of this report is twofold: first, the report explores and summarizes the state of 
collaboration and information availability from the oldest and most-developed formal institutions of 
collaborative cybersecurity: the Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), and identifies 
potential shortcomings and areas for development. Second, we introduce the reader to the Data 
Dashboard project, conducted under the auspices of the Exploring Cyber International Relations 
(ECIR) team at MIT and Harvard. The Dashboard will function as a simple, easy-to-use source on 
global and nation-level data, with specific emphasis on cybersecurity and threat data, as well as on 
related current events. The Dashboard is designed to help researchers, policymakers, IT professionals, 
and other stakeholders  to track potentially critical trends in relevant cybersecurity data, including 
attacks, threats, vulnerabilities, and defenses, etc. Increasing stakeholder access to summary and 
analytical data should significantly increase the efficacy of cybersecurity efforts at all levels, including 
individual and institutional defense, corporate and national policymaking, and high-level coordination 
and cooperation. 
Well-known collectors of relevant nation-level cybersecurity data are the Computer Emergency 
Response Teams, or CERTs. The largest CERTs typically operate at a national level as quasi-
governmental entities (that is, a country has its own CERT), but have a mandate to coordinate 
extensively with other CERTs within the country and in other countries, often under the auspices of the 
CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) operated by Carnegie Mellon University (CMU). While highly 
diverse, and often in infancy, these CERTs have the potential to not only provide critical cybersecurity 
data to all stakeholders, but also to coordinate responses to cyber attacks or to other cyber emergencies. 
A brief history, summary, and analysis of national-level CERT activities and their publicly available 
data are discussed below. 
 
2. Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) 
2.1 History and Purpose of CERTs 
The first CERT, at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), was launched in 1988 with funding from 
DARPA, as a response to the Morris Worm attack (which took down perhaps 10% of the Internet 
during November, 1988). The CERT mandate is now to develop and promote best management 
practices and technology applications to “resist attacks on networked systems, to limit damage, and to 
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ensure continuity of critical services.”1  
The CMU CERT, during the 1990s, began to help other countries develop their own CERTs and 
maintains to this day a formal Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) development 
program2, including for the United States. The CERT at CMU is now officially known as the CERT 
Coordination Center (CERT/CC), as many other response teams have chosen the name CERT (where 
others have chosen CSIRT). The Coordination Center works closely with US-CERT, the latter of which 
is an indirect branch of the Department of Homeland Security. It uses a largely decentralized approach 
to prevention of security failures (in education and training, helping create local CERTS, publishing 
information, etc), but is ready to lead a coordinated response with US-CERT and other local CERTs in 
order to stamp out major security failures or major threats.  
CERT/CC works in the following fields; these fields provide a guideline for the work of other national 
CERTs and CSIRTs around the world: 
z Software Awareness: Searches for, receives, analyzes, and reports major software security 
vulnerabilities and malicious code. Publishes advice on responses to vulnerabilities and threats, 
helping to create software more secure to attack.  
z Secure Systems: Engineering of networks that have high situational awareness and high 
response speed to deal with coordinated attacks. Goal is to create networks that can survive 
attack and continue functioning. 
z Organizational Security: Encourages and helps develop implementation of proper security 
management and software in individual organizations. Advocates government policy that 
increases security of national, corporate, and private systems.  
z Coordinated Response: Helps create and train response teams for different organizations, 
governments, and companies, including the Department of Homeland Security (US-CERT), and 
the National Computer Security Incident  Response Team  (CSIRT) of Qatar. Thanks largely to 
this training, the United States has dozens of smaller CSIRTs (that belong to enterprises or 
industry organizations) that work together to deal with high-risk threats, and to perform 
forensics on past security breaches.  
z Education and Training: Provides public training seminars, certification training/testing, as 
well as collegiate degrees at CMU. 
The interconnected nature of modern computer networking assures that major failures in the security of 
a single institution have the potential to create larger damage to other institutions, or even large 
portions of the Internet. To solve the collective action problem, CERTs were designed with 
decentralization and coordination in mind. Ideally, the national CERTs would overlook an array of 
CERTs at various levels below. CERTs within a single company or institution, in a sector, etc, would 
work with each other under the auspices of the national CERT in order to offer both robust prevention 
and monitoring capability and a decentralized, distributed response to emergencies and attacks that 
may arise. This ideal configuration would lead to an efficient coordination between organizations 
                                                 
1 http://www.cert.org 
2 http://www.cert.org/csirts/ 
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ranging from semi-government to non-profit to private/corporate to ensure both collective and 
individual security. Figure 1.1 (below) provides an abstract diagram of the potential hierarchies and 
responsibilities of a distributed CERT system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Ideal CERT Hierarchy and Relationship3 
As can be seen from Figure 1.1, the national CERT is intended to coordinate the activities of the other 
internal CERTS, such as those of individual enterprises, of industry organizations, and NGO/semi-
governmental organizational CERTs for different sectors of the economy. Vendor CERTs would be 
responsible for ensuring that state-of-the-art security is embedded in software, to prevent the spread of 
vulnerabilities. Commercial and internal CERTs would work together to disseminate best security 
practices to large enterprises. National and sector CERTs would collect and organize cybersecurity 
information, and coordinate active responses to major cyberseucrity threats or breaches.  
2.2 Current Status and Breadth 
In reality, the CERT security structure remains in its infancy in most countries that do have national 
CERTs, and the ideal CERT network (as explained above) is not even fully developed in the CERT's 
origin nation, the United States. Many countries do not have CERTs, but significant progress has been 
made over the past two decades in increasing the population of national CERTs and other CERT 
                                                 
3 http://www.first.org/resources/guides/cert-in-a-box/images/6.jpg 
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institutions in many countries with a large Internet user population or Internet-centric economy. While 
there is no authoritative centralized list of national CERT programs, the following list of 54 countries 
provides those that the authors have found. There are certainly other countries with some sort of 
cybersecurity teams, but these CERTs are more specifically national-level, cooperative, educating, and 
responsive organizations.  
 Countries with National CERTs4  
• Argentina • Australia • Austria 
• Bangladesh • Brazil • Brunei 
• Canada • Chile • China (PRC) 
• Croatia • Czech Republic • Denmark 
• Estonia • Finland • France 
• Germany • Greece • Hong Kong 
• Hungary • Iceland • India 
• Indonesia • Ireland • Israel 
• Italy • Japan • Latvia 
• Lithuania • Malaysia • Mexico 
• Myanmar • Norway • Pakistan 
• Philippines • Poland • Portugal 
• Qatar • Republic of Korea • Russia 
• Singapore • Slovenia • Spain 
• Sri Lanka • Sweden • Switzerland 
• Taiwan (ROC) • Thailand • Tunisia 
• Turkey • UAE • UK 
• United States • Uraguay • Vietnam 
Table 2.1: Countries with National CERTs 
 Most large enterprises have dedicated IT security teams, some of which are called CSIRTs or 
even CERTs (but many of which are not).5 These cybersecurity teams are often the targets of solicited 
surveys for collecting incident information and are the points of contact for dissemination of best 
practices and threat alerts. 
2.3 General Data Availability from CERTs 
                                                 
4 From  http://www.first.org/about/organization/teams/  and http://www.apcert.org/about/structure/members.html 
5 Some examples can be seen here: http://www.first.org/about/organization/teams/ 
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Many of the national CERTs collect information on a number of cybersecurity issues in their countries 
by year, quarter, or month. Information collection, in general, is conducted by surveys: organizations 
voluntarily (although often by solicitation) disclose attack types (placed on the organization) and 
defenses and shortcomings within the organization, etc. In addition, some CERTs have performed data 
collection through passive probes in their national networks. CERTs often aggregate these data to 
present nationwide reports on the state of cybersecurity during the reporting period, and trends over 
time. Some CERTs also ask institutions about their defenses and security technology, as well as request 
self-criticisms by institutions of their security readiness for different kinds of attacks, and policies, 
standards, etc, used by different institutions. The aggregated survey method has some interesting 
methodological artifacts that are worth noting. They are best described by two examples: if a single 
virus hits 1000 institutions (and they all report), then the virus is counted 1000 times. If 100 viruses hit 
a single enterprise, an “incident” reporting method will lead to 100 hits, where a “respondents” method 
will report only one hit (as a “respondents” method simply asks whether the respondent has 
experienced that specific problem in the reporting period.)  
An example graph from US-CERT is provided below and then briefly explained. 
Figure 2.1: Proportional Threat Reports by Quarter to US-CERT6 
While each CERT is usually consistent between reporting periods, data consistency between CERTs is 
limited. CERTs do not have a standardized typology of data: their surveys ask different questions and 
create different categories of attacks and vulnerabilities. CERTs lack a consistent data presentation 
method: some present data in absolute numbers of reports, others in percentages only. Term definition 
across CERTs is also sometimes inconsistent or unclear. Comparison and international aggregation are 
therefore often difficult, but there are a number of types of data that are commonly reported, in some 
                                                 
6 These types of attacks are the official US-CERT “Incident Category” designations, including “investigation,” which 
designates an attack whose nature and source are still under investigation.  
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form or another: 
US-CERT provides the most comprehensive and detailed definition of terms, as explained: “A 
computer incident within US-CERT is, as defined by NIST Special Publication 800-61, a violation or 
imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard 
computer security practices.” 
There are six categories regarding computer incidents used by US-CERT. 
CAT 1 -- Unauthorized Access: In this category an individual gains logical or physical access without 
permission to a federal agency network, system, application, data, or other resources. 
Other reports by US-CERT further elaborate on this definition: 
“Unauthorized Access is when a person who does not have permission to connect to or use a system 
gains entry in a manner unintended by the system owner…The specifics are different for each 
individual event but it could happen in any number of ways. Usually access is gained via unpatched 
software or other known vulnerabilities.” (“Unauthorized Access”) 
"Unauthorized access" entails approaching, trespassing within, communicating with, storing data in, 
retrieving data from, or otherwise intercepting and changing computer resources without consent. 
These laws relate to either or both, or any other actions that interfere with computers, systems, 
programs or networks.” (“Computer Hacking and Unauthorized Access Laws.”) 
CAT 2 -- Denial of Service (DoS): For example: Downloading files causes a significant amount of 
traffic over the network. This activity may reduce the availability of certain programs on your computer 
or may limit your access to the internet. (“Cyber Security Tip ST05-007”) 
“A ‘denial-of-service’ attack is characterized by an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent legitimate 
users of a service from using that service. Examples include attempts to "flood" a network, thereby 
preventing legitimate network traffic, attempts to disrupt connections between two machines, thereby 
preventing access to a service, attempts to prevent a particular individual from accessing a service , 
attempts to disrupt service to a specific system or person (…) Other types of attack may include a 
denial of service as a component, but the denial of service may be part of a larger attack. Illegitimate 
use of resources may also result in denial of service. For example, an intruder may use your anonymous 
ftp area as a place to store illegal copies of commercial software, consuming disk space and generating 
network traffic.  
There are three basic types of DoS attack:  
1) consumption of scarce, limited, or non-renewable resources 
2) destruction or alteration of configuration information 
3) physical destruction or alteration of network components” 
CAT 3 -- Malicious Code: Successful installation of malicious software (e.g., virus, worm, spyware, 
bot, Trojan horse, or other code-based malicious entity that infects or affects an operating system or 
application). The intent of such malicious code is often to take control of the computer or destroy or 
change information stored on the computer. Agencies are not required to report malicious logic that has 
been successfully quarantined by antivirus (AV) software.  
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CAT 4 -- Improper Usage:  Violation of acceptable usage policies (as established by the enterprise). 
CAT 5 -- Scans, Probes, or Attempted Access: any activity that seeks to access or identify a federal 
agency computer, open ports, protocols, service, or any combination for later exploit. This activity does 
not directly result in a compromise or denial of service. 
CAT 6 -- Investigation: Unconfirmed incidents of potentially malicious or anomalous activity deemed 
by the reporting entity to warrant further review. 
 
These definitions are not shared universally by other CERTs, but certainly provide a relatively 
authoritative guide to what statistical data represents.  
There are a few methodological concerns beyond incompatibilities that are worth noting. The survey 
style of information reporting on the part of CERTs means comparisons between nations with 
otherwise compatible data definitions and typology is difficult. Numerical comparisons can be 
misleading if the breadth of a survey is not explicitly clear—if both countries survey very different 
proportions of the population, then their absolute numerical data will be incomparable (though 
percentages may remain comparable). Additionally, even if survey respondents are relatively accurate, 
most respond on behalf of institutions—there may be disproportionate weights placed upon different 
institutions if response rates are significantly different. It is further unclear whether an incident at a 
large institution should be counted the same way as an incident at a smaller one. 
 
3  Examples of Specific Data Provided by Some CERTs  
Here we explore data available at select CERTs, including type of vulnerability/threat, frequency of 
publication, and other relevant information. A table below concisely displays relevant information 
about the data available at each CERT. Note that not all reports by national CERTs have quantitative 
data available. 
Country / 
Region 
Reporting 
Period 
Data 
Presentation 
Data Categories Formation 
Date 
Asia-Pacific 
(Regional) 
Annual   ? 
Australia Annual Percentage Many ? 
Brunei None N/A N/A 05/01/04 
Bangladesh None N/A N/A 07/01/07 
China Semi-Annual Numerical Website Malicious Code, Spam, 
Virus/Worm/Trojan, Phishing, Vulnerabilities, 
Botnet, DoS Attack 
10/01/00 
Hong Kong Annual Numerical Website Alerts, Virus Alerts, Virus Incidents ? 
Indonesia Occasional Numerical? ? ? 
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India Monthly Numerical Scanning, Malicious Code, Spamming, 
Phishing, SQL Injection, Website Compromise / 
Malware Injection 
? 
Japan Quarterly None N/A ? 
Korea Monthly ? <Data Corrupted> 07/01/96 
Malaysia Occasional Numerical DoS Attacks, Viruses/Malicious Code, others 01/13/97 
Pakistan Occasional ? Defacement, others? ? 
Myanmar Unknown N/A (No Website) ? 
Philippines Unknown N/A (No Website) ? 
Qatar None None None ? 
Russia Yearly Numerical Malware, Phishing, DoS, Unauthorized Access, 
Scan/Password Bruteforcing, Others 
? 
Sri Lanka None None None 06/01/06 
Singapore None None None 10/01/99 
Taiwan None None None 09/01/87 
Thailand None None None 2000 
Vietnam None None (No English Version) 12/01/05 
Canada None None (No Website) ? 
USA Quarterly Percentage Unauthorized Access, DoS, Malicious Code, 
Improper Usage, Scans/Probes/Attempted 
Access, Under Investigation 
11/01/88 
Mexico Unknown N/A (No English) ? 
Argentina None None None 05/01/99 
Brazil Quarterly Numerical Worm, Spam, Scanning, DoS, others ? 
Austria None None (No English) ? 
Belgium None None None ? 
Croatia None None None ? 
Czech 
Republic 
None None None 1996 
Denmark None None (No English) ? 
Estonia Yearly Percentage Computer Viruses, Personal Data Abuse, Spam, 
others 
2005 
Finland None None None ? 
France None None None ? 
Germany Occasional None None ? 
Greece None None (No English) ? 
Hungary None None None ? 
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Iceland None None (No Website) ? 
Ireland None None None ? 
Israel None None None ? 
Italy N/A N/A (Must be registered for statistics) 1994 
Latvia Occasional Numeric ? ? 
Lithuania Yearly ? ? ? 
Netherlands None None None ? 
Norway Monthly None None ? 
Poland None None (No Website) 1993 
Portugal Monthly None (No English) ? 
Slovenia None None None ? 
Spain Yearly Numeric “Vulnerabilities” ? 
Sweden None None None ? 
Switzerland ? ? Internet Background Noise 1987 
Turkey None None None ? 
UK None None None ? 
Table 3.1: Selected National CERT PubliclyAvailable Data 
To illustrate the types of CERT data available, examples are provided below. These examples are 
provided largely to emphasize the diversity of data available at CERTs across the world (and, similarly, 
inter-CERT data inconsistency). The five national CERTs chosen below are the United States, China, 
India, Russia, and Estonia. 
3.1 US-CERT 
The United States national CERT is affiliated with the Department of Homeland Security, and is a 
distinctly different entity from CERT/CC at Carnegie Mellon University (which is an independent and 
academic entity). These two largest US CERTs share information and, in the case of a large-scale 
attack, will often coordinate extensively in leading a response.  
Examples of information provided is shown in Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. 
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Figure 3.2: US-CERT - Incidents by Category, 2008 Q47 
 
 
Figure 3.3: US-CERT - Top 5 Incidents vs. Others, 2008 Q48 
                                                 
7  US-CERT Quarterly Trends and Analysis Report Nov 7th, 2008 (http://www.us-
cert.gov/press_room/trendsanalysisQ408.pdf)  
8  US-CERT Quarterly Trends and Analysis Report Nov 7th, 2008 (http://www.us-
cert.gov/press_room/trendsanalysisQ408.pdf)  
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Figure 3.4: US-CERT - Percentages of Top 5 Incidents vs. Others, 2007 Q2 – 2008 Q49 
 
The charts and graph above suggest that the greatest threat by frequency to US institutions and users is 
some form of attempted information access, namely phishing. The vast majority of threats reported to 
US-CERT are related to attempts to deceive the user (phishing, malicious website, non-cyber) rather 
than direct attacks against the defenses of the computer or the network. Figure 3.2 breaks down 
reported incidents by official US-CERT category; Figures 3.3 and 3.4 describe more specific attacks 
(each attack falling into one of the official categories). As can be seen, most “Scans, probes, and 
attempted access” attacks are phishing. Comparing the two graphs, we see that phishing (at 72% of all 
incidents) makes up the vast majority of attempted access attacks (at 77% of all incidents), suggesting 
that by far, most access attempts attack the user rather than the software or hardware directly.  
 
 
                                                 
9  US-CERT Quarterly Trends and Analysis Report: (http://www.us-cert.gov/reading_room/)  
 Note: a trend line at 0% does not indicate that the incident did not occur, but that it was not a top 5 incident; it is grouped with 
“others” 
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Figure 3.5: US-CERT - Types of Detected Misuse, by Year10 
 
Figure 3.5 describes different sub-categories of misuse of enterprise computing equipment, which can 
lead to any of the US-CERT categories of attacks. Above we observe a general decline in the most 
pervasive of misuses over the past 5 years, including viruses, insider abuse, mobile theft, unauthorized 
access, and denial of service attacks. Proportional increases are seen in a number of “misuses” occur in 
2004, which suggests (although we have no confirmation of) their addition to the reporting and 
collecting mechanisms by US-CERT, rather than sudden onset of their use. Because the above statistics 
represent a percentage of all respondents (rather than a percentage of all incidents reported), the decline 
in largest misuses (including viruses, insider abuse, mobile theft, unauthorized access, etc) may be due 
to an actual reduction in the incident as a problem, suggesting that IT professionals and companies in 
the US may be responding well to the most prevalent security threats. 
 
 
                                                 
10   2008 CSI Computer Crime & Security Survey (http://i.zdnet.com/blogs/csisurvey2008.pdf ) and 2005 CSI/FBI 
Computer Crime and Security Survey (http://www.cpppe.umd.edu/Bookstore/Documents/2005CSISurvey.pdf)  
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3.2 CN-CERT (China) 
Examples of the China CERT (CN-CERT) national-level data is shown below. 
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Figure 3.6: Total Incidents Reported to CN-CERT (not including Scanning), Jan 2006 – June 200811 
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Figure 3.7: Total Incidents Reported to CN-CERT (not including scanning) by Year, 2003-200712 
                                                 
11  China-CERT Report  (http://www.cert.org.cn/articles/docs/index.shtml)   
 Note: Incident reporting changed in January 2007 to no longer include CN-CERT detection, only voluntary reporting, 
leading to the significant drop in reports.  
12   China-CERT Report  (http://www.cert.org.cn/articles/docs/index.shtml 
 Note: Incident reporting changed in January 2007 to no longer include CN-CERT detection, only voluntary reporting, 
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At least until 2006, we observe a dramatic (and perhaps exponential) growth in incidents. After 2006, 
due to the change in reporting structure of CN-CERT, the trend is difficult to follow. This growth in 
absolute number of incidents is likely at least as much due to an explosion in Internet users in China as 
it is due to an increase in vulnerabilities.  
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Figure 3.8: CN-CERT – Selected Events per Year, 2005 – 200713 
 
Here we observe a dramatic proportional increase in botnets and spam as reported by CN-CERT. Such 
attacks typically represent organized for-profit ventures rather than purely destructive attacks, and 
usually target users, rather than technical defensive network capabilities. Denial of Service attacks 
actually decline from few to literally none in the first half of 2008, suggesting either a reporting bias or 
an increase in (already extensive) government cybersecurity defensive effectiveness. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
leading to the significant drop in reports.  
13  China-CERT Report  (http://www.cert.org.cn/articles/docs/index.shtml)   
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Figure 3.9: CN-CERT Distribution of Incidents by Category, 2008 Q1 & Q214 
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Figure 3.10: CN-CERT Distribution of Incidents by Category, 2007 Q3 & Q415 
 
                                                 
14  China-CERT Report 2008 Q1 and 
Q2(http://www.cert.org.cn/UserFiles/File/CISR2008fh.pdf1.pdf)   
15  China-CERT Report 2007 and 2007 Q1 & Q2 (http://www.cert.org.cn/servlet/Articles?channel=docs&for=0&page=2) 
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Figure 3.11: CN-CERT Distribution of Incidents by Category, 2007 Q1 & Q2 
 
Throughout 2007 and into 2008, the primary trend observed is a relative increase in spamming; 
phishing decreases proportionally to some extent, and malicious website code increases briefly and 
drops again. 
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Figure 3.12: CN-CERT Distribution of Incidents by Category, 200616  
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Figure 3.13: CN-CERT Distribution of Incidents by Category, 200517 
 
Between 2006 and 2007, CN-CERT changed its reporting methodology, removing “Website 
Composite” from the list of reported incidents on distribution charts. This removal allows the reader to 
more easily observe trends after 2006, though a significant proportional increase in spam and a 
proportional decrease in phishing through the 2005-2007 period.  
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16   China-CERT Report 2007 Q1 and Q2  
 (http://www.cert.org.cn/UserFiles/File/2006CNCERTCCAnnualReport_Chinese.pdf)  
17  China-CERT Report 2005 (http://www.cert.org.cn/upload/2005CNCERTCCAnnualReport_Chinese.pdf)  
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Figure 3.14: CN-CERT – Websites Attacked in China by Quarter, 2008 Q1 – 2009 Q318 
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Figure 3.15: CN-CERT – Websites Attacked in Hong Kong and Taiwan by Quarter, 2008 Q1 – 2009 Q3 
 
Over the relatively short period in the above graphs, we observe a downward trend in website attacks 
in Mainland China, which may be due to increased sophistication in government control. Hong Kong 
and Taiwan also seem to show a gradual downward trend in attacks, though the trend is not as sharp as 
in the mainland.  
 
                                                 
18 China-CERT Web Composite Monthly Report: (http://www.cert.org.cn/)  
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3.3 CERT-IN (India) 
 
Examples from CERT-IN are presented below: 
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Figure 3.16: CERT-IN – Total Reported Incidents by Month, October 2006 – April 200919 
 
Here we observe a marked and rapid increase in total reported incidents, starting in 2008, with spikes 
in December 2008 and March 2009. The long-term increase may be due to increases in reporting, vast 
increases in Internet usage, increases in attacks, or any combination of the three.  
                                                 
19  CERT-In Monthly Security Bulletin: (http://www.cert-in.org.in/knowledgebase/SecurityBulletin/)   
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Figure 3.17: CERT-IN – Incidents by Category by Month, January 2008 – April 200920 
 
This graph suggests that most incidents reports are on the rise (which is to be expected), except for 
spamming, which appears to be slowly decreasing over time, suggesting potentially increased 
spamming defenses (like spamscreens) in deployment. It also suggests that malicious code and website 
compromise / malware propagation are the major forms of attack in India. It should be noted that this is 
quite different from the United States, where Phishing is the major reported attack.  
                                                 
20  CERT-In Monthly Security Bulletin: (http://www.cert-in.org.in/knowledgebase/SecurityBulletin/)   
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Figure 3.18: CERT-IN - Proportional Incidents by Category by Month, January 2008 – April 200921 
 
In the Figure 3.18 we observe a more marked reduction in the percentage of Phishing, Scanning, and 
Spamming over time, suggesting that user-oriented attacks have decreased in general. A significant 
spike (both in “Malicious Code” and “Website Compromise & Malware Propogation”) in January 2009 
suggests an anomaly in reporting or recording, leading to the two (admittedly similar) concepts to be 
switched, though a simple coincidence is possible. Either way, by 2009, attacks on software 
infrastructure, rather than direct attacks on users, appear to dominate cybersecurity issues in India.  
 
                                                 
21  CERT-In Monthly Security Bulletin: (http://www.cert-in.org.in/knowledgebase/SecurityBulletin/)  
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3.4 Russia CERT 
 
We provide a few examples of data from Russia CERT below: 
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Figure 3.25: Russia CERT – Proportion of Incidents by Type, 200722 
 
 
Figure 3.26: Russia CERT – Incidents Reported by Status, 2006-200823 
 
The above graphs indicate that in Russia, user-centered attacks like malware and phishing are high 
proportions of reported incidents, much like the United States (and unlike India).  
                                                 
22  http://www.cert.ru/stat.html (originally in Russian) 
23  http://www.cert.ru/conference2008.html 
 Note: Best interpretation suggests that “Closed(+)” indicates an incident that was resolved to satisfaction; “Closed(-)” 
indicates an incident that was resolved unsatisfactorily; “Remain” indicates incidents that remain unresolved. 
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3.5 CERT Estonia 
 
CERT Estonia, established in 2006, is young, particularly interesting, due to its involvement in constant 
low-level (and occasionally high-level) cyberwar presumably with Russia. The data examples below 
are from the Estonian RISO State Information Office24: 
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Figure 3.27: CERT Estonia – Security Problems by Type, as a Percentage of Internet Users, 2005-
200725 
 
The above graph shows a slightly different story in Estonia than the US or China. Computer viruses 
take up a much larger proportion of cybersecurity incidents—a larger proportion than even spamming. 
Reporting methodology may be to blame for this discrepancy: specifically, the survey refers to 
“security problems” for a particular user—many may not consider spamming a serious “security 
problem” even if they are spammed. Most users report having had no problems, which may suggest 
that most indeed had no major problems, or that standards for security in personal users are more lax.  
 
 
 
                                                 
24 For more information on RISO, see http://www.riso.ee/en 
25  TNS Emor e-Track survey, http://www.riso.ee/en/files/eSeire_uuringu_internet_security_2007_I_ENG_2005-2007.pdf  
 Note: “I” indicates the first half of the year; “II” indicates the second. 
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Figure 3.28: CERT Estonia – Security Problems by Type, as a Percentage of  
Corporate Enterprises, 2005 – 200726 
 
The above graphs reveal that the majority of enterprises in Estonia report that no serious problems have 
occurred, and that the trend seems to be relatively positive. This is surprising, given Estonia's troubled 
cyber relationship with its neighbor, Russia, but suggests either that attacks have decreased or that 
Estonian defenses have become more sophisticated throughout the 2000s or reporting does not capture 
all events. Furthermore, corporate enterprises seem to report an even lower proportion of security 
incidents than personal users, though it should be noted that the categories reported are significantly 
different, making the two results difficult to compare. Furthermore, the lack of differentiation between 
number of attacks on corporate enterprises leaves open the distinct possibility that certain enterprises 
are attacked often and deliberately, where others are not high-priority targets to attackers. We do not 
know if the 10-40% of attacked enterprises were attacked once or a hundred times.  
 
                                                 
26 TNS Emori uuring "Info - ja kommunikatsioonitehnoloogia kasutamine Eesti ettevõtetes 
 http://www.riso.ee/en/files/Emor_Computer_Security_2007_I_2005-2007.pdf  
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3.6 Summary 
 
These examples illustrate a number of interesting key points, some of which will be discussed in more 
detail later. First, the nature of cybersecurity issues varies widely between different countries, in 
sometimes surprising ways. Estonia seems to have a surprisingly low number of incidents per 
enterprise capita, particularly given its history with Russia. The predominant type of threat in China 
and the United States is against the user directly—phishing, spamming, improper usage, and other 
attempts to trick the user into compromising his own security; in Russia and India, malware and 
malicious code attacks are more common, and there is no clear explanation as to why. 
 
Second, reporting methods vary significantly between different CERTs. No two CERTs above reported 
information in the same way; variations in incident or threat definitions, in typology, in frequency and 
chronological scale, and in reporting methodology (some CERTs report by total number of reports, 
some by proportion of total incidents, some by proportion of respondents). These inconsistencies make 
cross-country comparisons (and, presumably, information coordination) challenging – though trends 
over time might be identifiable. 
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4. The ECIR Data Dashboard 
4.1 Purpose 
The ECIR Data Dashboard is developed to provide historical trend data as well as current statistics and 
news to policymakers, academics, IT professionals, and other stakeholders. By consulting the 
Dashboard, the user can compare trends in national-level Cybersecurity threats/vulnerabilities among 
several countries and/or regions, as well as compare these trends against other relevant national-level 
statistics to find patterns and correlations. To this extent, the Dashboard provides data in three 
categories: 
◦ Demographic Data: Basic data about a country's population, economy, education level, and 
other attributes that may affect the development of the country's Internet services or IT 
security sectors. (Source: World Development Indicators Database) 
◦ IT Data: Data outlining the state of the country's IT infrastructure, usage, and security, 
including Internet bandwidth, users, servers, etc. (Sources: ITU, World Development 
Indicators, CIA World Factbook ) 
◦ Cybersecurity Data: Data provided largely by national CERTs that reflect chronological 
trends threat/vulnerability statistics.  
The Dashboard allows the user to select any number of countries and/or regions with which to compare 
data. While the default x-axis measurement is year (future versions will consider other time scales such 
as quarter, month), any data can be selected for the y-axis, allowing the user to compare correlations in 
multiple strands of data. Additionally, the Dashboard allows the user to divide any strand of data into 
another. This allows the user to compare the data in new ways. For example: dividing population into 
any measurement creates a “per capita” measurement. Also, the user can compare the viruses reported 
per number of Internet users. Future versions will further allow the user to compare the viruses 
reported per number of Internet users per capita, requiring two division functions. Additionally, the 
user can select to graph the data on a linear or logarithmic scale. The Dashboard thus provides the user 
with a great amount of flexibility and power in finding exactly what data to compare, how to compare 
it, and how to illustrate it, so that international cybersecurity can be deeply and robustly investigated.  
4.2 Development 
The Dashboard was developed in three primary parts: web user interface, database generation, and 
newsfeed. A regulated interface between the user interface front-end and the database back-end allow 
information flow from the back-end to the front to operate seamlessly and robustly though changes in 
code.  
Web User Interface 
The user interface is a Web application designed to query a database and create graphs of information 
on-the-fly. The user interface provides a number of fields from which the user can select the 
countries/regions of interest, the x-axis variable (i.e., start year and end year for the observation) and 
the y-axis variable (i.e., measurement data to observe) as well as graphing type (linear or logarithmic). 
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The “submit” button sends the request, after which the web application reads the requested data from 
the back-end database and draws the graph, automatically scaling the axes to reflect a “best fit” view of 
the data. 
 
Figure 4.1: Web User Interface of the Cybersecurity Dashboard 
Figure 4.1 is a screenshot of the Dashboard configuration. As shown in Figure 4.1, a number of 
countries are listed in the left side. In the selection list, the countries are grouped into corresponding 
regions. From the list, the user can select several countries and/or regions of interest27. By selecting the 
start year and the end year, the user can set the observation period. The Dashboard currently 
incorporates a chronological range of 2000 to 2008. In the right side of the page, the user can select one 
or two attributes (i.e., measurement data). In case of two attributes, the user should also select an 
operator by which the data of interest can be calculated from them. The current Dashboard provides 
only the Division operator by which Attribute 1 is divided by Attribute 2 can be observed. The user can 
also set the y-axis to a linear or logarithmic scale – which is particularly helpful when comparing data 
strands that different considerably in values, such as comparing large and small countries, as illustrated 
later. 
 
                                                 
27 Multiple countries can be selected by holding down the “Ctrl” key. 
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Figure 4.2: Example Request to Generate Graph of # Personal Computers per Capita 
 
Figure 4.3: Generated Graph of # Personal Computers per Capita 
Figure 4.2 is a request to display the number of PC per capita of three countries (in this example, 
China, Croatia, and Estonia) from 2000 to 2004. Figure 4.3 is the resulting screenshot from the 
Dashboard. For convenience, the actual data from the database is listed in the table below the graph. 
Database 
The back-end database of the Dashboard is the Palo MOLAP database28. MOLAP stands for 
                                                 
28  http://www.jedox.com/ 
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“Multidimensional On-Line Analytical Processing,” which is an approach to quickly answer 
multidimensional analytical queries. The Palo database uses a multidimensional data model, allowing 
multidimensional structures to organize data and express the relationships between the data. These 
structures are broken into cubes; the cubes are able to store and access data within the confines of each 
cube. Each cell within a multidimensional structure contains aggregated data related to elements along 
each of its dimensions. The output of a MOLAP query is displayed in a matrix format in which the 
dimensions form the rows and columns, and the relevant measurements form the data values. By using 
MOLAP database, the Dashboard can quickly answer queries of any aggregated data, such as regional 
data. Palo consists of a mature MOLAP database server and an Excel add-in. Furthermore, JPalo 
provides a set of Java API to manipulate the Palo database29. These features make it an excellent choice 
as the back-end database of the Dashboard. 
In the current stage, there exists one cube with three dimensions in the Palo MOLAP database. The 
three dimensions are “Countries”, “Years” and “Attributes”. When the country, year and attribute are 
determined, the corresponding measurement data can be accessed.  
Recent Headlines 
The Dashboard uses Chameleon to create a list of top-relevance recent news headlines. Cameleon is a 
web extraction engine developed by MIT to automatically extract any piece of data of interest from 
semi-structured documents (e.g., web pages). In the current stage, the Dashboard lists recent news 
articles using the search terms “cyber security OR computer spam OR cyber” in Google News30. The 
Dashboard displays the up-to-date news story snippets at the bottom of the user interface page, with 
hyperlinks that allow the user to open the full story in a new window or tab on their browser. 
 
Figure 4.4: Dashboard Recent Headlines (on July 17, 2009) 
                                                 
29  http://www.jpalo.com/ 
30  http://news.google.com/ 
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4.3 Interesting Demonstrations 
 
Figure 4.5: Total CERT Reported Incidents from 2003 to 2008 (Linear) 
Figure 4.5 is a screenshot of the total CERT reported incidents of three countries (China, Malaysia and 
Brazil) from 2003 to 2008. It shows that the total CERT reported incidents of Brazil are much greater 
than that of China and Malaysia in almost of all years – the actual amount data is gathered in the table 
below the chart. Because of the huge differences, the data strands of China and Malaysia are pushed to 
the bottom of the chart in the linear Y-axis style.  
 
Figure 4.6: Total CERT Reported Incidents from 2003 to 2008 (Logarithmic) 
Figure 4.6 is also a screenshot of the total CERT reported incidents of three countries from figure 4.4 
(China, Malaysia and Brazil) from 2003 to 2008. Unlike Figure 4.5, the user uses the logarithmic Y-
axis style for the chart, so that the data strands of the three countries are more clearly shown in Figure 
4.6. 
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Figure 4.7: Virus/worm/malicious code/malware from 2002 to 2008 (Logarithmic) 
Figure 4.7 is a screenshot of “Virus/worm/malicious code/malware”, a category of the reported CERT 
incidents, of two countries (Malaysia and Brazil) from 2002 to 2008 with logarithmic Y-axis style in 
the chart. 
 
Figure 4.8: Percentage of Virus/worm/malicious code/malware from 2002 to 2008 (Logarithmic) 
Figure 4.8 is a screenshot of “Virus/worm/malicious code/malware” divided by “Total CERT Reported 
Incidents” of two countries (Malaysia and Brazil) from 2002 to 2008 with logarithmic Y-axis style in 
the chart. In other words, Figure 4.8 shows the data strands of the percentage of a category of the total 
reported CERT incidents, in this case, “Virus/worm/malicious code/malware”.  
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Figure 4.9: Dos & Integrity Attacks from 2000 to 2008 (Logarithmic) 
Figure 4.9 is a screenshot of “Dos & Integrity Attacks”, a category of the reported CERT incidents, of 
two countries (i.e., Malaysia and Brazil) from 2000 to 2008 with a logarithmic Y-axis style in the chart. 
 
Figure 4.10: Percentage of Dos & Integrity Attacks from 2000 to 2008 (Linear) 
Figure 4.10 is a screenshot of “Dos & Integrity Attacks” divided by “Total CERT Reported Incidents” 
of two countries (Malaysia and Brazil) from 2000 to 2008 with a linear Y-axis style in the chart. In 
other words, Figure 4.10 shows the data strands of the percentage of a category of the total reported 
CERT incidents, in this case, “Dos & Integrity Attacks”.  
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Figure 4.11: Total CERT Reported Incidents per Capita from 2003 to 2007 (Logarithmic) 
Figure 4.11 is a screenshot of “Total CERT Reported Incidents” divided by “Population” (thus creating 
a per capita measurement) of two countries, Malaysia and Brazil, from 2003 to 2007 with a logarithmic 
Y-axis style in the chart.  It is interesting that the per capita number of reported incidents started at very 
different levels (in 2003), but the rate has dropped sharply in Brazil while rising sharply in Malaysia 
such that they are about equal rates by 2007. 
 
Figure 4.12: Electric Power Consumption (kWh) per Capita from 2003 to 2006 (Linear) 
Figure 4.12 illustrates other types of analyses that can be done, such as “Electric Power Consumption 
(kWh)” divided by “Population” (creating a per capita measurement) of four countries (China, 
Malaysia, Germany and USA) from 2003 to 2006 with a linear Y-axis style in the chart.  
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Figure 4.13: GDP (2008 US Dollars) per Capita from 2000 to 2007 (Linear) 
Figure 4.13 is the screenshot of “GDP (2008 US Dollars)” divided by “Population” (creating a per 
capita measurement) of three countries (China, USA and Brazil) from 2000 to 2007 with a linear Y-axis 
style in the chart.  
4.4 Current Status of Data Dashboard Prototype 
The current status as of August 7, 2009, includes a working prototype of the Dashboard. The database 
has some gaps in cross-time or cross-national CERT coverage. In the next phase, more extensive types 
of data and better sources of data are being sought.  
The current variables expressed in the prototype Dashboard include: 
Demographic Data IT Data Cybersecurity Data 
Population (#) Internet Users (#) Total incidents (#) 
Gross Domestic Product (USD) International Bandwidth (MBps) Phishing (#) 
Software Piracy Losses (USD) Personal Computers (#) Trojan/worm/malware (#) 
Energy Consumption (KWh/yr) Hosts (#) (D)DoS (#) 
Total Education Enrollment (%) Secure Servers31 (#) Spam (#) 
Table 4.1: Variables in the Data Dashboard 
The current list of countries in the Dashboard are:  United States, China, India, Germany, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Brazil,  Estonia, Latvia, Croatia, Malaysia, Australia. 
                                                 
31 “Secure Servers” are those that use fully cryptographed communication.  
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Both the number of countries and the types of data will be significantly expanded in future versions. 
The particular cybersecurity data availability of each category, by country, is presented below: 
Type  USA China India Korea Malaysia Brazil Germany Japan Estonia Croatia Latvia 
Malicious 
Code Prop. Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. None None Prop. None None 
Phishing Prop. Abs. Abs. None None None None Abs. Prop. None Prop. 
Scanning Prop. Abs. None None None Abs. None Abs. None None None 
Spam None Abs. Abs. None Abs. Abs. None None Prop. None None 
DoS None Abs. None None Abs. Abs. None None None None Prop. 
Table 4.2: CERT-based Cybersecurity Data by Country32 
4.5 Challenges 
A number of challenges and opportunities for discovery and improvement remain for the Cybersecurity 
Dashboard project. 
Data Availability 
The availability of data varies by category, but is often limited or nonexistent. In particular, the 
cybersecurity category of data is particularly difficult to find. CERTs are the primary source of such 
data, but many countries do not have national CERTs, and many national CERTs do not provide much 
data, if any at all. The lack of data availability will continue to be a pressing challenge for the ECIR 
Dashboard project.  
Data Consistency & Reliability 
Among CERTs that have data available for nation-level threats and vulnerabilities, consistency is a 
serious problem. Many of the CERTs that have such data have only begun recording data within the 
past three or four years; this makes historical trend analysis limited in utility. Furthermore, a lack of 
consistency between CERTs makes the deployment of a single framework for comparison of 
cybersecurity data difficult. CERTs often do not share similar reporting styles (some report in absolute 
numbers; some report in percentages only); they often do not share categorization methods for 
threats/vulnerabilities (identifying different groups into which threats/vulnerabilities fall differs 
between almost every CERT). There are some very general categories that can be constructed 
successfully, but they are uncommon. Data consistency and reliability issues will continue to pose a 
challenge for the ECIR Dashboard project and will be a major focus of our future activities. 
                                                 
32 In this table, “Prop.” represents a source hosting proportional data; “Abs.” represents absolute numerical data; “None” 
represents no data. Most data threads are not available for all years of the dashboard (2000-2008); most CERTs that 
publish quantitative data have only published in the past few years; many have not yet released a publication with 2008 
data. 
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Appendix A: Sources of Data Currently Used in the Prototype ECIR Dashboard 
 
The years covered by the current data used in the prototype ECIR Dashboard is summarized in the table below: 
  
# Hosts
# Personal 
Computers
# Secure 
Internet 
Servers
# Users w/ 
Internet 
Access
DoS & 
Integrity 
Attacks
Electric 
Power 
Consumpti
on (kWh)
GDP (2000 
US Dollars)
International 
Bandwidth 
(MB/s)
Phishing/
personal 
data 
abuse Population Scanning
School 
enrollment, 
tertiary (% 
gross)
Software 
Piracy 
Losses ($M)
Australia
2000-2004,  
2006-2008 2000-2004
2001, 
2003-2008 2000-2007 none 2000-2006 2000-2007 2000-2005 none 2000-2007 none 2000-2006 2003-2008
Brazil
2000-2004,  
2006-2008 2000-2005
2001, 
2003-2008 2000-2007 all 2000-2006 2000-2007 2000-2005 none 2000-2007 all 2000-2005 2003-2008
China
2000-2004, 
2006-2008 2000-2006
2001, 
2003-2008 2000-2007 2005-2008 2000-2006 2000-2007 2000-2005 2005-2008 2000-2007 2003-2005
2000-2003, 
2006
2001, 2003-
2008
Croatia
2000-2004, 
2006-2008 2000-2004
2001, 
2003-2008 2000-2007 none 2000-2006 2000-2007 2000-2005 none 2000-2007 none
2000-2003, 
2005-2006 2003-2008
Estonia
2000-2004, 
2006-2008 2000-2007
2001, 
2003-2008 2000-2007 none 2000-2006 2000-2007 2000-2005 none 2000-2007 none 2000-2006 2003-2008
Germany
2000-2004, 
2006-2008 2000-2006
2001, 
2003-2008 2000-2007 none 2000-2006 2000-2007 2000-2005 none 2000-2007 none none 2003-2008
India
2000-2004, 
2006-2008 2000-2007
2001, 
2003-2008 2000-2007 none 2000-2006 2000-2007 2000-2005 2007-2008 2000-2007 2007-2008 2000-2006
2001, 2003-
2004, 2007-
Japan all 2000-2004
2001, 
2003-2008 2000-2007 none 2000-2006 2000-2007 2000-2005 none 2000-2007 none 2000-2006 2003-2008
Latvia
2000-2004, 
2006-2008 2000-2006
2001, 
2003-2008 2000-2007 none 2000-2006 2000-2007 2000-2005 none 2000-2007 none 2000-2006 2003-2008
Malaysia
2000-2004, 
2006-2008 2000-2006
2001, 
2003-2008 2000-2007 all 2000-2006 2000-2007 2000-2005 none 2000-2007 none 2000-2005 2003-2008
ROK
2000-2004, 
2007-2008 2000-2008
2001, 
2003-2008 2000-2007 none 2000-2006 2000-2007 2000-2005 none 2000-2007 none 2000-2006 2003-2008
USA all 2000-2006
2001, 
2003-2008 2000-2007 none 2000-2006 2000-2007 2000-2005 none 2000-2007 none 2000-2006 2003-2008  
 
The sources of each of these data fields is listed below:  
# Hosts: 2000-2004: ITU Data, all other: CIA World Factbook 
# Personal Computers: 2000-2004: ITU Data, all other: World Development Indicators Database 
# Secure Internet Servers: World Development Indicators Database 
# Users w/ Internet Access: World Development Indicators Database 
DoS & Integrity Attacks: Country-Specific CERT where available 
Electric Power Consumption (kWh): World Development Indicators 
GDP (2000 US Dollars): World Development Indicators 
International Bandwidth (MB/s): World Development Indicators Database 
Phishing/personal data abuse: Country-Specific CERT where available 
Population: World Development Indicators 
Scanning: Country-Specific CERT where available 
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross): World Development Indicators Database 
Software Piracy Losses ($M): BSA & IDC Global Software Piracy Study 
Total CERT Reported Incidents: Country-Specific CERT where available 
Virus/worm/malicious code/malware: Country-Specific CERT where available 
 
The specific resources referred to above are described below: 
The World Development Indicators Database (WDI) describes itself as “the statistical benchmark 
that helps measure the progress of development. The WDI provides a comprehensive overview of 
development drawing on data from the World Bank and more than 30 partners. It includes more 
than 800 indicators in over 90 tables organized in 6 sections: World View, People, Environment, 
Economy, States and Markets, and Global Links.” We believe that the World Bank has less reason 
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to mis-represent data than other sources might. Because of this trustworthiness, the WDI is our 
primary statistical source.   
For further information, see: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:21725423~p
agePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html  
 
The Annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study tracks global losses due to piracy, mainly 
as a tool for business strategists. To do this they “Determine how much PC packaged software was 
deployed in [a given year;] Determine how much PC packaged software was paid for/legally 
acquired in [this given year; and] Subtract one from the other to get the amount of pirated 
software.” As the data was intended for strategic use, we believe it to be highly trustworthy. 
Unfortunately, the BSA & IDC Global Software Piracy Study was only begun in 2003 – and do not 
provide data from previous years. 
For more information, please see: http://global.bsa.org/globalpiracy2008/index.html  
 
The International Telecommunications Union publishes a “The World Telecommunication/ICT 
Indicators Database [which] contains time series data… for around 100 sets of telecommunication 
statistics (updated) covering telephone network size and dimension, mobile services, quality of 
service, traffic, staff, tariffs, revenue and investment… Selected demographic, macro-economic and 
broadcasting statistics are also included.” Because countries self-report certain series in the ITU 
database, we believe there is a small risk of inflation. To avoid this, we have only relied on ITU 
data where the WDI data is notably less complete. 
For further information, please see: http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/publications/world/world.html  
 
An additional resource, The CIA World Factbook “provides information on the history, people, 
government, economy, geography, communications, transportation, military, and transnational 
issues for 266 world entities.” The CIA World Factbook receives their data from other groups and 
databases, including those groups otherwise mentioned here. In the interest of continuity, we have 
only referenced the CIA World Factbook for data that we could not find in a first-level database.  
For further information, please see: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
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Appendix B: Summary of Reporting By Selected National CERTs 
Appendix B is a full summary of the reporting habits of selected National CERTs, and their founding year (if known). Many of these 
reports do not contain quantitative data or charts; the following appendix should thus not be used as a guide to quantitative data for 
aggregation projects.  
 
Country / Region 
Quarterly 
Report / 
Half-year 
Report 
Yearly 
Report 
Not-specified 
Monthly 
Report 
Specified 
Monthly 
Report 
Others Date Formed 
Asia 
Asia Pacific 
Computer 
Emergency 
Response Team  
(contains 15 
countries’ 
CERT, including 
China) 
N/A 
 
2003-
2008 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Australia CERT N/A N/A N/A N/A 1. Yearly Australian Computer 
Crime and Security Survey: 
2002-2006  
(http://www.auscert.org.au/rend
er.html?it=2001) 
2. AusCERT Newsletter but 
only access to authorized 
member, updated until July 
2004 
 
N/A 
Brunei CERT  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A May 2004 
Bangladesh 
CERT 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A July 2007, 
right now 
the 
publication 
tag is not 
available 
China Half-
yearly  
Report: 
2005 - 
2007 
N/A Composite 
Website 
Monthly 
N/A Oct 2000 
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Country / Region 
Quarterly 
Report / 
Half-year 
Report 
Yearly 
Report 
Not-specified 
Monthly 
Report 
Specified 
Monthly 
Report 
Others Date Formed 
2005 -- 
2008 
Q1&Q2 
Report: 2006 -
- March 2009 
Hong Kong 
CERT 
N/A N/A N/A N/A Only available: 
Alerts received from websites 
from 2001-2009; 
Virus alerts from websites from 
2001-2009; 
Number of incidents reported 
from 2001-2009; 
Virus incidents reported from 
2001 -2009; 
N/A 
Indonesian 
CSIRT 
N/A N/A N/A N/A Almost no tags is available.  
Events only updated until 2005 
N/A 
India N/A N/A July 2006 - 
April 2009 
Phishing 
Incidents 
Trend Report:  
Jan 2009 -- 
March 2009 
 N/A 
Japan CERT-CC Quarterly
: 2008Q2 
– 2009 
Q1 (in 
Japanes
e); 
2000Q1 
– 
2009Q1
， 
1996Q4  
   Vulnerabilities Quarterly Report: 
2004Q3 – 2008Q4； 
 
Weekly Bulletin: Sep 6th 2006 - 
June 10th, 2009  
N/A 
Korea CERT N/A N/A Jan 2006 – 
Jan 2009 
Phishing 
Activity Trends 
Report: Feb 
2005 – Jan 
2009 
N/A 
JUL. 1996  
Korea National N/A Only 2004 1)Monthly N/A N/A N/A 
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Country / Region 
Quarterly 
Report / 
Half-year 
Report 
Yearly 
Report 
Not-specified 
Monthly 
Report 
Specified 
Monthly 
Report 
Others Date Formed 
Computer 
Emergency 
Response Team 
Cyber 
Security: 
June 2004 – 
April 2009 
(contains 
events 
distribution, 
number of 
events per 
month) 
2) Cyber 
threat trends 
and 
countermeas
ures: Jan 
2005 – May 
2008 
(contains 
detailed data) 
Malaysia CERT Situation
al report 
on major 
worms 
outbreak
s up to 
2003 in 
Malaysia. 
N/A N/A N/A Having statistics about number 
of incidents and distribution of 
different events from 1997 to 
2009 (annually) 
(http://www.mycert.org.my/en/se
rvices/statistic/mycert/2009/mai
n/detail/625/index.html)  
January 13, 
1997 
Myanmar CERT     Link is not available  
Pakistan CERT N/A N/A N/A N/A Defacement statistics from 1999 
– 2008. 
N/A 
Philippine 
CERT 
     Not 
available 
Qatar CERT  N/A N/A N/A N/A No statistics is found  
Russia CERT N/A N/A N/A N/A Only2007 events distribution is 
available only in Russian: 
http://www.cert.ru/stat.html  
N/A 
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Country / Region 
Quarterly 
Report / 
Half-year 
Report 
Yearly 
Report 
Not-specified 
Monthly 
Report 
Specified 
Monthly 
Report 
Others Date Formed 
Sri Lanka CERT  N/A N/A N/A N/A Not about statistics:  Cyber 
Security Term Glossary: 
http://www.slcert.gov.lk/index.ph
p?q=8&id=27  
June 2006 
Singapore CERT N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A October 1997 
Taiwan 
Computer 
Emergency 
Response 
Team/Coordinati
on Center 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
No statistics is found 
Sep 1987 
Taiwan National 
Computer 
Emergency 
Response Team 
N/A N/A N/A N/A No statistics is found  N/A 
Thai CERT N/A N/A N/A N/A (English version only has “about 
Thai CERT). 
The Thai version needs double 
check. I could not find any 
statistics from it. 
2000 
Vietnam N/A N/A N/A N/A (English version is being 
established) 
Dec 2005 
North America 
Canadian Cert     Link is not available N/A 
Computer 
Emergency 
Response Team 
-Coordinating 
Centre 
N/A N/A N/A N/A Only vulnerabilities statistics 
from 1988-2008, and they are 
no longer publish or collect 
those data. 
N/A 
Forum of 
Incident 
    Its focus is not on publishing the 
statistics data 
1990 
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Country / Region 
Quarterly 
Report / 
Half-year 
Report 
Yearly 
Report 
Not-specified 
Monthly 
Report 
Specified 
Monthly 
Report 
Others Date Formed 
Response and 
Security Teams 
US-CERT N/A Quarterly Reports: 
2006Q3 -- 
2008 Q4 
N/A Nov 2007 -- 
May 2009 
N/A N/A 
Mexico (MX)  N/A N/A N/A N/A Only in Mexican N/A 
South America 
Argentinian 
CERT 
N/A N/A N/A N/A No published statistics was 
found 
May 1999 
CAIS- Brazilian 
Research 
Network CSIRT  
N/A N/A N/A N/A Number of Incidents reported. 
1997-2009 (yearly and monthly) 
http://www.rnp.br/en/cais/statisti
cs/  
N/A 
Computer 
Emergency 
Response Team 
Brazil 
2000Q1, 
2003Q1- 
2009Q1 
((http://w
ww.cert.b
r/stats/)  
Half-
year: 
1999, 
2000, 
1999-
2008 
(http://ww
w.cert.br/s
tats/) 
N/A Spam: Jan 
2009- April 
2009; 
Number of 
spam (yearly): 
2003 - 2009 
1）Daily statistics for the 
network flow data directed to 
honeypots from the Brazilian 
Honeypots Alliance 
(http://www.honeypots-
alliance.org.br/stats/)  
2) Total number of incidents 
reported 1999 - 2009 
 
 
NIC BR Security 
Office Brazilian 
CERT  
The 
same as 
above  
The same 
as above 
The same as 
above 
The same as 
above 
The same as above  
European 
Austrian CERT N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Did not find English version 
N/A 
Belgian CERT  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Crotian CERT N/A N/A N/A N/A The English version is only 
partly translated.  
N/A 
Czech Republic N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1996? 
45 
 
Country / Region 
Quarterly 
Report / 
Half-year 
Report 
Yearly 
Report 
Not-specified 
Monthly 
Report 
Specified 
Monthly 
Report 
Others Date Formed 
CERT  
Danish CERT     English version covers almost 
nothing and online translation is 
not working for this website. 
Cannot write any summry here 
because of language. 
 
Estonian CERT  N/A N/A N/A N/A http://www.riso.ee/en/node/22 
has the only available data: 
2005 - 2007 
 
Finland CERT N/A N/A N/A N/A No statistics was found N/A 
France 
Industry,services 
and Tertiary 
CERT 
N/A N/A N/A N/A No statistics was found N/A 
French CERT N/A N/A N/A N/A No statistics was found. 
No English version. 
N/A 
German CERT N/A N/A N/A N/A http://www.cert.dfn.de/index.php
?id=aw-typen contains 
examples of reports for some 
events, such as defacement, 
Phishing; only in German. 
N/A 
Greek Research 
and Technology 
Network CERT  
N/A N/A N/A N/A No English version is available. 
No statistics was found. 
N/A 
Hungarian CERT N/A N/A N/A N/A No statistics was found N/A 
Iceland     Link is not available  
Ireland N/A N/A N/A N/A No statistics was found N/A 
Israeli CERT  N/A N/A N/A N/A No Israeli-oriented data was 
found. Only contains document 
links for other reports. 
N/A 
Israeli 
Government 
CERT 
      
Italian CERT N/A N/A N/A N/A No statistics can be access 
unless register 
1994 
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Country / Region 
Quarterly 
Report / 
Half-year 
Report 
Yearly 
Report 
Not-specified 
Monthly 
Report 
Specified 
Monthly 
Report 
Others Date Formed 
Latvian CERT  N/A N/A N/A N/A Only the current 3 months’ 
event distribution is available (in 
one graph and in Latvian) 
http://www.ddirv.lv/?cat=3  
N/A 
Lithuanian CERT  N/A Yearly 
statistic: 
2001- 
2008  
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Netherlands 
CERT 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Norwegian 
Computer 
Emergency 
Response Team  
 N/A Jan 2009 – 
April 2009, 
do not 
contain data 
such as 
number of 
incidents, 
distribution 
of different 
events:   
N/A N/A Jan 2006 
Norwegian 
Network for 
Research 
Education CERT 
N/A N/A N/A N/A No statistics was found N/A 
Poland CERT 
Research and 
Academic 
Network 
N/A N/A N/A N/A The link to CERT Polska 
(www.cert.pl) is not available. 
(1993) 
Portuguese 
CERT 
N/A N/A Jan 2005 – 
March 2009, 
only available 
in 
Portuguese.  
N/A  N/A 
Slovenian CERT  N/A N/A N/A N/A No statistics was found N/A 
Spanish CERT  N/A N/A N/A N/A Only number of vulnerabilities 
from 2005-2009, vulnerabilities 
N/A 
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Country / Region 
Quarterly 
Report / 
Half-year 
Report 
Yearly 
Report 
Not-specified 
Monthly 
Report 
Specified 
Monthly 
Report 
Others Date Formed 
data in 2008 and 2009. 
Sweden N/A N/A N/A N/A No statistics was found N/A 
Swiss Academic 
and Research 
Network CERT 
     Internet Background Noise 
(IBN) 2003 – 2009 
(http://www.switch.ch/se
curity/services/IBN/)  
1987 
Turkish CSIRT  N/A N/A N/A N/A The statistics page has nothing 
about number of incidents or 
distribution of events: 
http://www.ulakbim.gov.tr/ulakne
t/istatistik/  
N/A 
United Kingdom  N/A N/A N/A N/A No statistics about cyber events 
was found 
 
 
